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PUBLIC DOLLARS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS: THE 
CASE OF TUITION TAX CREDITS. Edited by Thomas 
James1 and Henry M. Levinz. Philadelphia: Temple Univer-
sity Press. 1983. Pp. viii, 271. $29.95. 
Chester E. Finn, Jr. 3 
One can grow a mite weary of tuition tax credits, even though 
they have never been written into the Internal Revenue Code. The 
proposal itself-and the disputes it always ignites-has been with us 
for so many years as to resemble the man who came to dinner. Nor 
are chances great that this feisty and loquacious guest will depart 
anytime soon. Indeed, a renewed effort to enact federal tuition tax 
credit legislation is sure to be part of the second term agenda of the 
Reagan administration. 
For the record, a tuition tax credit is a credit against the in-
come tax otherwise owed to the Federal Treasury by a person pay-
ing tuition to an approved school (or college) on behalf of himself or 
a dependent. From the tax code perspective, it resembles the child 
care credit and certain other expenses that one can subtract directly 
from taxes due; in this respect it differs from a deduction, which is a 
subtraction from taxable income and which yields a greater or lesser 
"value" to the taxpayer depending on his bracket. A credit is worth 
the same to every taxpayer, regardless of his marginal rate, pro-
vided he owes enough tax to subtract it from. (A so-called "refund-
able" tax credit would yield an actual payment from the Treasury 
to any taxpayer eligible for a credit that exceeded his tax liability.) 
The maximum amount of the credit varies with the specific provi-
sions of the legislative proposal; the most generous versions Con-
gress has considered in recent years would confer a credit of fifty 
cents against each dollar of tuition paid, up to a maximum credit of 
$500 per student per year. Some versions include college as well as 
elementary-secondary school tuitions; a few have even been re-
stricted to college (and other postsecondary) education. But the 
real political interest-and major controversy-attaches to the tax 
credit as a source of financial relief for the parents of children at-
tending private schools at the elementary-secondary level. 
The contemporary wave of interest in this idea began to roll in 
l. Researcher in the History and Politics of Education, Institute for Research on Edu-
cational Finance and Governance, Stanford University. 
2. Professor of Education and Economics, Stanford University; Director of the Insti-
tute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance. 
3. Professor of Education and Public Policy, Vanderbilt University. 
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around 1971, a time when private school enrollments were plum-
meting and Catholic parochial schools were closing their doors at a 
rapid rate, seemingly for want of students. What to do about this 
situation-which at the time looked grave indeed-was among the 
questions President Nixon gave to a national commission on school 
finance that he established in 1970 and to a special panel on non-
public schools that he created within it. Enactment of a federal tax 
credit for private school tuition was one of the panel's recommenda-
tions, rapidly embraced by the Nixon administration and a number 
of Congressmen, especially Representatives from the urban North-
east where faltering Catholic schools were most heavily 
concentrated. 
The tax credit recommendation was the product of two hopes. 
First, proponents reasoned that dwindling private school attend-
ance could be ascribed to the onerous burden of tuition payments 
that, if offset in part by the government, could be borne by more 
families that already had the will to patronize private schools but 
could ill afford to. Second, the tax credit, being among the most 
indirect of all forms of government aid, is less vulnerable to consti-
tutional challenge on the ground that it violates the establishment 
clause. Or so its advocates hoped. Because the Supreme Court over 
the years had rejected any number of more direct state subsidies of 
nonpublic elementary and secondary education, aid proponents rea-
soned that a tax credit had a better chance of withstanding that 
kind of lawsuit, which was bound to be filed by the vigilant church-
state separation groups that are always concerned about such 
things. Not only would there be no direct payment of government 
funds into the coffers of the private schools (the vast majority of 
which were-and are-church-affiliated); unless the credit were re-
fundable there wouldn't even be an actual payment from the Treas-
ury to the tuition payer. The government would simply receive less 
revenue than it otherwise might expect. The taxpayer would find it 
easier to send his children to the school of his choice. And the pri-
vate schools would benefit either from the ability to raise their fees 
or from added enrollment of youngsters whose parents would be 
less oppressed by current tuition rates. 
No one could be certain that either side of this complex equa-
tion was correct. Would the Supreme Court actually view a tax 
credit as a different sort of beast than a direct subsidy program? 
Would indirect financial assistance to parents truly boost private 
school enrollments or enable the schools to raise their fees, thereby 
balancing their books without additional students? This was not 
knowable. But neither was the obverse. As is so often the case in 
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public policy debates, a sort of conventional wisdom quickly arose 
in which all of the values of pluralism, diversity, and choice in 
American education were embodied in the tuition tax credit strat-
egy, while the secularists, statists, and public school monopolists 
were arrayed in the opposition. As much as any legislative proposal 
of recent times, this one conjured up villains and heroes, demons 
and angels, in the eyes of participants on either side. 
Repeatedly through the decade of the 1970's, Senators and 
Representatives introduced tuition tax credit bills. It was not ex-
actly a partisan proposition. Though Republicans were more apt 
than Democrats to favor it, some of the strongest proponents were 
liberal Democrats from the Northeast, men such as Abraham Ribi-
coff, James Delaney, James Burke, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. 
Indeed, it was Moynihan, in partnership with Oregon Republican 
Bob Packwood (and Ribicoff and Delaware's William Roth), who 
became a prime sponsor of the best-known tax credit proposal of 
the era, commonly called the "Packwood-Moynihan Bill," which 
came very close to passing Congress in 1978. 
The Carter administration and the public school establishment 
teamed up to beat this legislation, and after considerable effort they 
succeeded. (Their principal weapons were the billion and a quarter 
dollars that President Carter offered as a countermeasure designed 
to aid middle-income college students through established grant 
and loan mechanisms, which diverted the tax credit support that 
would have come from the higher education community; and the 
recruitment of several Southern Senators who were prepared to as-
sert that at the elementary-secondary level tax credits would subsi-
dize "segregation academies" and foster a new era of racial 
separation and discord.) Although tuition tax credit measures have 
been introduced into Congress at every session since then, and since 
1981 have enjoyed strong White House support as well, in retro-
spect it appears that the fracas over Packwood-Moynihan in 1978 
represented the apogee of political interest in this measure at the 
national level, that passions (on both sides) have since ebbed some-
what, and that the subsequent reenactments of this legislative 
drama have been a bit ritualistic. In early 1985, as I write, it seems 
likely that the reenactments will continue indefinitely into the fu-
ture, but I cannot identify a single serious observer of the political 
or educational scene who expects the outcome to change. 
It was in the heat of national interest in tuition tax credits at 
the end of the 1970's that Stanford University's Institute for Re-
search on Educational Finance and Governance (IFG), a federally 
supported school policy analysis center, began to pay closer atten-
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tion to this proposal and commenced the project that gave rise first 
to a much-publicized symposium in late 1981 and, two years later, 
to Public Dollars for Private Schools, a collection of essays originally 
prepared for that symposium.4 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can also see that even as in-
terest in the tax credit was cresting, the major problem that had 
given rise to this solution was resolving itself. After a long slide 
that began in the late 1960's, private school enrollments leveled off 
in the mid-seventies and by decade's end were slowly rising. We 
can also see that, in aggregate terms, the decline that looked so wor-
risome to the President's Commission on School Finance in 1971 
was not a general problem of private education but a specific phe-
nomenon of the Roman Catholic parochial schools. Because these 
were the largest segment of private education, their severe loss of 
students made it appear as if nongovernmental schooling as a whole 
was very ill. But in fact the non-Catholic sector of private educa-
tion never shrank and-especially as public school enrollments 
dwindled in the seventies-it actually came to represent a larger 
fraction of the total school population. Moreover, by the early 
1980's, total enrollment of Catholic schools was stabilizing, and 
other segments of private education, notably the Protestant funda-
mentalists, were growing rapidly. Because government data on pri-
vate school enrollments have never been entirely satisfactory, 
particularly with regard to students attending newly opened 
schools, and because some of the fundamentalist schools were disin-
clined to participate in surveys, this revival was not well-docu-
mented or widely acknowledged. The most recent estimates by the 
National Center for Education Statistics (using some new tech-
niques for locating schools and students overlooked earlier) indicate 
that private school enrollments in 1983 represented 12.2% of all 
students, still not quite back up to their historic peak of 13.9% in 
the mid-sixties.s 
This is not the place to venture an explanation of the precipi-
tous erosion of Catholic schooling during the decade from the late 
sixties to the late seventies, save to note that it had multiple causes, 
not all of them economic. Nor will I try to account for the recent 
4. In the interest of full disclosure, let me note that I participated in the event-
though not in the book-as the "affirmative" side of a televised debate on the merits of tuition 
tax credits that was held in conjunction with the symposium. American Federation of Teach-
ers president Albert Shanker spoke for the "negative" side. 
5. By "historic," I am talking about this century. Public schools did not even come 
into existence until the mid-nineteenth century, and for a long time the distinction between 
public and private was ambiguous in communities whose children attended "academies" that 
were substantially financed with public resources but operated under more or less private 
auspices. This arrangement persists today in a few New England towns. 
552 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 2:548 
surge of interest in non-Catholic private schooling except to observe 
that it has had something to do with the spread of Protestant funda-
mentalism and something to do with widening concern about the 
lackluster quality of public education. The essential point, not 
without some historic irony, is that insofar as the rationale for tui-
tion tax credits was to "save" private schooling from vanishing, the 
malady was curing itself even as the proposed remedy was at-
tracting the greatest interest-and being rejected. 
There are several other persuasive arguments, apart from insti-
tutional salvation, for supplying public financial aid to private 
schools and to families attending them. First, many people believe 
that educational diversity, competition, and choice are inherently 
preferable to uniformity, homogeneity, and monopoly, and that 
therefore society should assist private education. Second, families 
that do patronize private schools-and in most cases pay tuition in 
order to do so-also pay taxes in support of public schools; this 
double financial burden is thought by some to be unfair and thus a 
sound reason for government to redeploy resources so as to lighten 
it. Third, while the right to send one's children to private rather 
than public schools was vouchsafed by the Supreme Court in 1925 
(in Pierce v. Society of Sisters), it is a hollow right for poor families 
that lack the wherewithal to exercise it. The society should there-
fore devise affirmative measures to make available to low-income 
families the kinds of educational options that the well-to-do can ob-
tain for themselves. 
Depending on which of these policy objectives one is most ea-
ger to achieve, various measures can be devised involving different 
levels of government and promising greater or lesser attainment of 
the desired outcome. Tuition tax credits may be a means to one or 
more of these ends, but ought not be regarded as an end in them-
selves.6 They are not the only conceivable means, nor necessarily 
6. At the level of symbolic politics and rough justice, tax credits do emerge as a rea-
sonable objective in their own right. The major federal school aid programs enacted in 1965 
and thereafter are based on a very important political concordat. The Catholic bishops 
agreed to stop blocking education aid, which they had done very effectively up until then, 
provided that private school students were assured their fair share of the federal monies to be 
committed. Congress wrote that assurance into law, but created a clumsy mechanism that 
has never worked satisfactorily from the standpoint of private schools. They do not receive 
their aid funds in cash, nor do their students ever see a penny of it. Instead, local public 
schools are expected to provide educational "services" to private school youngsters. Study 
after study has shown that private school students have in fact received only a small fraction 
of the services to which they are entitled. Thus the quest for tuition tax credits that continues 
in 1985 is in part a crusade for remediation of a clearcut injustice of two decades' duration, an 
injustice worsened in July 1985, by a Supreme Court decision blocking the simplest way of 
delivering compensatory education services to disadvantaged youngsters attending sectarian 
private schools. 
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the surest or most efficient. A state might, for example, organize its 
entire school finance system into a "voucher" scheme whereby all 
school-age children are entitled to chits worth whatever sum of 
money the state is prepared to devote to their educations and can 
use these to purchase instruction at the schools of their choice. (A 
locality might do this as well.) Alternatively, the state or federal 
government could supply aid in the form of grants or scholarships 
to students attending private schools, even while it also pays for the 
operation of public schools, much as is done at the college level, and 
such aid might-like most student assistance in higher education-
be apportioned under a means test. The possibilities are many, lim-
ited only by one's policy imagination and, of course, by the political 
and legal obstacles to enactment and implementation. 
It should be noted, too, that even the appearance of vibrant 
institutional health among extant private schools does not mean 
that these other policy objectives are being achieved, or that there is 
not a legitimate case for devising workable means of achieving 
them. Educational choice at the elementary-secondary level is in 
most cases a reality only for middle- and upper-income families. 
(The exceptions generally depend on privately funded scholarship 
programs.) Private school enrollments are skewed to the more 
prosperous portions of the population. Competition is not very 
lively, if it is present at all, among the schools in particular commu-
nities. The double-payment burden continues to be heavy for many 
of the families that elect private schooling. 
But as is usually the case with policy debates, for every argu-
ment there is a counterargument, for every claim a counterclaim. 
Private education, it is said by some, is a luxury, like membership in 
a country club; people cannot be prevented from purchasing it for 
themselves, but society's obligation is fulfilled by supplying public 
schools. The double-taxation argument is no more persuasive to 
adherents of this view than is the claim that society should provide 
taxi fare rebates to people who do not favor public buses or sub-
ways. As for the principle of educational diversity and choice, it is 
fiercely opposed by those who contend that the public school ought 
to be a "common school," a great democratizing experience in 
which all are treated alike, regardless of their personal characteris-
tics or family backgrounds, and in which each receives the uniform 
core education that all participants in adult society should have. 
(This does not actually occur in many public schools, but the rheto-
ric endures.) The contention that private schooling should be acces-
sible to the poor as well as the rich is turned on its head by 
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individuals who assert that private schools are a bastion of privilege 
and that the last thing a liberal society should do is help them to 
enroll more students, even poor youngsters who want to attend 
them but cannot afford to do so. 
Then, of course, there are the "big four" arguments against any 
sort of public aid to private education. First, that most private 
schools are church-affiliated, that subsidizing attendance at them is 
inseparable from state aid to organized religion, and that this vio-
lates the Constitution. Second, that many private schools practice 
selective admissions and that some of these discriminate on the ba-
sis of race or ethnicity; to assist students to attend them is to en-
courage segregation and thus to violate more constitutional 
principles, not to mention sundry civil rights laws. Third, that to 
succor private education is necessarily to damage public education, 
if only by denying it resources (and presumably students) and that 
this goes against the grain of the republic. Fourth-in stark con-
trast with the previous point-to supply government aid to private 
schools is inevitably to snarl them in a web of government regula-
tions, thus to diminish their distinctiveness and their independence, 
and thereby to erode the very attributes that make them desirable 
elements of a diverse culture and an open society. 
These allegations, too, can be paired with counterarguments. 
Concerning the establishment clause, proponents of school aid ar-
gue that the Founding Fathers meant to bar government preference 
for a particular religion, not to preclude measures that may have the 
indirect effect of assisting religion in general. The racial discrimina-
tion allegation can be rebutted by noting that most private schools 
have virtual "open admissions" policies, that only a handful engage 
in racially discriminatory practices, and that adroit legislative 
craftsmanship (and suitable enforcement mechanisms) can keep 
that handful outside the domain of aid recipients. As for the "death 
of public education," though this is invoked with intense fervor by 
those who want people to believe it, the fact is that even at its high-
water mark, private education attracted less than fourteen percent 
of all children; that only a feverish imagination can conceive of pri-
vate schools luring a huge proportion of public school students, no 
matter what the aid arrangements; and that, in any case, if public 
schools cannot hold onto students save by compulsion and the de-
nial of alternatives, then they have so little going for them that we 
need not tarry over their institutional welfare. 
The hardest of the "big four" arguments to rebut is the last, the 
contention that aiding private schools, however indirectly, will in 
time cause so many regulations to be applied as eventually to leave 
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them indistinguishable from the public schools. It is hard to iden-
tify a single major sector of American society where once-private 
institutions retained their full sovereignty after they became major 
recipients of government aid. Consider the private colleges and 
hospitals, just for openers. Perhaps the most that can be said is that 
virtually all states regulate private schools today, beginning with 
fire and safety requirements and often going on to matters of curric-
ulum, teacher qualifications, and student achievement testing. So, 
too, does the federal government, if only through the terms and 
conditions associated with tax exemptions conferred by the Internal 
Revenue Service. (Save for a handful of "proprietary" institutions, 
all private schools either possess or covet these exemptions.) Hence 
additional regulations would yield a difference only of degree, not of 
kind; it might be worth enduring them in order to benefit from the 
additional aid; and since the aid would presumably be optional, 
each school could determine for itself whether the benefits exceed 
the costs. 
These generic issues get some of the attention they deserve in 
the present volume, though its focus on the specific policy mecha-
nism of tuition tax credits limits its value as a general guide to the 
larger questions. Unfortunately, once one acknowledges that pri-
vate schools do not face imminent extinction, the tuition tax credit 
no longer looks like an ideal way to achieve the most compelling 
social policy objectives associated with public aid to private schools. 
That's not to say the mechanism couldn't be redesigned to meet 
other objectives: a tax credit, after all, can take as many forms as a 
direct grant program. But in the specific versions that Congress has 
considered, which are the versions scrutinized in the James-Levin 
book, the tuition tax credit is more satisfactory for solving the prob-
lem that no longer exists than for, say, fostering real educational 
choice among low income families or engendering lively competi-
tion among schools. 
It also needs to be said that Levin and James recruited a panel 
of authors who, with only a few exceptions, did not find it difficult 
to contain their enthusiasm for public aid to private schools. The 
major exception is Nathan Glazer, whose chapter is the only one 
among thirteen in this volume that leaves the reader with the sense 
that aid advocates may have the better of the argument. A couple 
of other writers are equivocal or noncommital, but the overall effect 
of the book is to depict tuition tax credits-and, by implication, 
other forms of aid to private schools-as at best inconsequential, at 
worst quite harmful. Nor is it clear in every instance that such 
conclusions are entirely the product of "objective" analysis. Aid to 
556 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 2:548 
private schools turns out to be one of those public policy issues 
where the analyst's conclusions often follow predictably from his 
values and his politics. This may well be true at some level with 
every significant policy dispute; I cannot here take up the general 
question of objectivity in applied social science. But in this instance 
we are dealing with an exquisitely sensitive political issue on which 
practically everyone has strong convictions. It would be too much 
to expect the contributors to a book on the subject not to let their 
convictions color their conclusions. 
Nevertheless, Public Dollars for Private Schools is worth read-
ing. Despite some predictable unevenness among its essays, one can 
learn a lot about private schools and about the political, economic, 
social, legal, and educational implications of aiding them with pub-
lic funds. There is an absorbing historical chapter by one of the 
brightest young analysts, coeditor Thomas James; an enlightening 
explanation by Joel Sherman of how other pluralistic democracies 
have dealt with these same issues; a good deal of economic analysis, 
including a solid piece by Richard Murnane; an adequate if routine 
summary of the legal and constitutional issues by Donald Jensen; 
and a pair of spirited essays of a "pro-con" nature by Glazer and 
David W. Breneman, who doesn't like tuition tax credits but is 
openminded enough to point out that serious advocates of educa-
tional choice ought to consider vouchers. 
It is usually the fate of policy analysts to produce their best 
work long after the actual policymakers have made up their minds 
about an issue and, often as not, after the issue itself has been more 
or less resolved in the political arena. Had this book appeared five 
years earlier, it would have been a bestseller, at least in Washington. 
Today it seems a bit passe, for most of the air has gone out of the 
tuition tax credit balloon. But that does not mean the dilemmas of 
public policy toward private education have disappeared or that the 
underlying issues don't still need debate, analysis, and deliberation. 
As I write, the Supreme Court is pondering the first amendment 
acceptability of a set of arrangements by which private school stu-
dents benefit (or, more commonly, don't) from existing forms of 
federal aid, such as the big Title I program that provides compensa-
tory educational services for disadvantaged youngsters. Several 
governors are weighing voucherlike schemes for educational finance 
at the state level. A number of states are roiled by dissent over the 
proper amount of public regulation of private schooling and-its 
logical extension-"home schooling." These dilemmas are apt to 
be with us for a very long time to come, even if they do not center 
on the specific policy mechanism of federal tuition tax credits. For 
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at the heart of American education is an ambiguity that we have 
never resolved, in all likelihood cannot and probably should not re-
solve. Is the education of the child fundamentally an extension of 
home, parents, community, and sect? Or is it fundamentally a pro-
cess of socialization into citizenship, into the "public culture," and 
into a set of life choices that transcend the boundaries of one's im-
mediate circumstances? It can be either; for most of us, it is some of 
each; but we aren't likely ever to reach consensus about how much 
it is the one and how much the other. Hence we aren't likely ever to 
settle the profound political controversies that underlie and sur-
round the narrower issues examined in this book. 
THE CONSTITUTION: THAT DELICATE BALANCE. 
By Fred W. Friendlyt and Martha J. H. Elliott.2 New York: 
Random House. 1984. Pp. 339. $17.95. 
Mark SilversteinJ 
Soon after the Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama, 
Felix Frankfurter (then America's best known Harvard law profes-
sor) wrote a piece for the Times explaining the meaning and signifi-
cance of the deci~ion.4 Within a few days he received a note from 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone: 
I liked your piece in the Times about the Scottsboro case. I doubt if you realize how 
important it is that judicial action be interpreted to the common man. Just at the 
moment I am getting violent letters from many people who seem to think that in the 
Scottsboro case we passed on the guilt or innocence of the petitioners, and starting 
with that assumption the writers draw the conclusion that the Supreme Court has 
now started out on a course which will alford no protection to the innocent victims 
of assault. 
Frankfurter quickly replied: 
How generous you are in your encouragement, that you should note so modest a 
piece as the one in the Times about the Scottsboro case. When the request for it 
came from the Times, urging the need of a correct exposition of the meaning of the 
decision, I was under great pressure. . . . But just because I feel as strongly as you 
do about the importance of clarifying judicial action to the laity, I felt it in the 
nature of a public duty to yield to the request of the Times. 
Doubtless I do not realize the extent of such a need, certainly as you are made 
to feel it from the correspondence which comes to you from time to time. Indeed I 
I. Edward R. Murrow Professor of Journalism, Columbia University. 
2. Instructor, Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. 
3. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston University. 
4. Frankfurter, A Notable Decision, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1932, § 2, at I. 
